In periods of geopolitical tension, public curiosity about worst-case scenarios often intensifies, especially when nuclear weapons enter the conversation. Alex Wellerstein, a historian of nuclear weapons and secrecy, has frequently explained that in any hypothetical large-scale nuclear conflict, targets would not be chosen randomly or purely for dramatic effect. Instead, they would likely be selected according to military doctrine, strategic value, and the attacker’s objectives. Analysts distinguish between counterforce targets—facilities tied directly to nuclear command, missile silos, submarine bases, and bomber wings—and countervalue targets, which focus on major population centers or symbolic cities.

The logic, grim as it is, revolves around degrading an adversary’s ability to respond or projecting overwhelming psychological shock. Wellerstein’s work emphasizes that these scenarios are analytical exercises, not predictions, designed to illustrate how nuclear strategy has historically been structured. The very act of mapping potential targets underscores how nuclear deterrence operates: by making clear that any attack would invite catastrophic retaliation. Understanding that framework can be sobering, but it also highlights why deterrence has, thus far, prevented direct nuclear confrontation between major powers.